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immediately to pay out earnings and profits as dividend so
termination inadvertent).
1 2 I.R.C. § 1362(f).
1 3 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
1 4 Ltr. Rul. 9003056, Oct. 26, 1989.
1 5 I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(A)(ii).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.  The debtor leased
grain and manure storage equipment and continued to possess
and use the equipment during the bankruptcy case.  Two of
the leases were in default prior to the bankruptcy filing and
all three leases terminated by their terms after the filing.  The
debtor did not assume the leases and agreed to return the
equipment to the lessor.  The court held that although the
debtor did not make full use of the equipment during the
debtor's post-petition possession, the lessor was entitled to
an administrative expense claim for the fair rental value of
the equipment while the debtor possessed it post-petition.
Matter of Thayn Farms, Inc., 117 B.R. 5 1 2 0
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1988).
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The Chapter 7 farm debtors
claimed a disc, planter and tractor as exempt under the federal
tools of the trade and wild card exemptions in Section 522(d).
The debtors also sought to avoid liens against the equipment
to the extent of the exemptions.  The court held that large
farm machinery such as the equipment here are eligible for
the tools of the trade exemption for farm debtors.  In re
Sugarek, 117 B.R. 271 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990).
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor owned an interest in a state
mandated retirement account which was accumulated while
the debtor was a public school teacher.  On the date the peti-
tion was filed, the debtor was no longer employed as a
teacher and had the right to withdraw amounts the debtor had
contributed to the account.  The court held that the state
retirement account was a spendthrift trust under Iowa law and
excludible from the debtor's estate except that because the
debtor's employment had terminated and the debtor could
withdraw funds from the account, the account was no longer
a spendthrift trust and was included in the debtor's estate.
The court also held that the debtor's interest in the account
which could be withdrawn was exempt under the special
exemption provided in the law creating the retirement
account, Iowa Code Chapter 97B.  Matter of Carver,
116 B.R. 985 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990).
The debtor lived in Iowa and owned an interest in a
Nebraska city employee retirement account which prohibited
assignment or attachment.  The debtor could not make any
withdrawals from the account before termination of employ-
ment or retirement, and at the date of the bankruptcy peti-
tion, the debtor was still employed with the city.  The court
held that the retirement account was a spendthrift trust under
Nebraska law and excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy
estate.  The court provided an alternative analysis that if the
account was includible in the estate, the debtor would not be
entitled to an exemption under Iowa Code 627.6(8)(e),
because the amount in the account was not reasonably neces-
sary for the support of the debtor.  Matter of Layton,
116 B.R. 995 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990).
The debtor lived in Iowa and owned an interest in a
Nebraska state employee retirement account which was
exempt from taxes, execution and attachment and which
prohibited assignment.  The debtor could not make any with-
drawals from the account before termination of employment
or retirement, and at the time of the petition, the debtor was
still employed.  The court held that the retirement account
was a spendthrift trust under Nebraska law and excluded from
the debtor's bankruptcy estate.  The court provided an alterna-
tive analysis that if the account was includible in the estate,
the Iowa exemption for interests in retirement accounts was
not preempted by ERISA.  The court found insufficient
evidence on the record to determine whether the account was
necessary for the support of the debtor.  Matter o f
Gouker, 116 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990).
The debtor owned an interest in an employer funded
ESOP which was qualified under ERISA.  The debtor was
prohibited from assigning her interest in the plan and could
not make withdrawals until termination of employment or
retirement, and at the time of the petition, the debtor was
still employed.  The court held that the ESOP was a
spendthrift trust under Iowa law and excluded from the
bankruptcy estate.  The court provided an alternative analysis
that the Iowa exemption for the plan was not preempted by
ERISA but that the debtor's interest in the plan would not be
exempt because it was not necessary for the support of the
debtor.  Matter of Bartlett, 116 B.R. 1015 (Bankr.
S.D. Iowa 1990).
The debtor claimed a homestead exemption in a rural
home and farmland acquired by will from a parent.  At the
time of the petition, however, the debtor and family lived in
an urban home several miles from the claimed homestead.
Although the debtor farmed the land, the debtor never lived in
the claimed homestead but only filed a statement of intended
homestead prior to filing bankruptcy.  The court denied the
homestead exemption and found that the urban residence was
the debtor's homestead for exemption purposes because the
debtor did not take any overt actions which established
homestead qualities on the claimed homestead or established
abandonment of the old residence.  In re  Bohac, 1 1 7
B.R. 256 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
The debtor owned an interest in an employee annuity plan
provided by the employer and claimed the interest as an
exempt annuity under Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2329.66(A)(6)(b),
3911.10.  The court held that the debtor's interest in the
annuity was not eligible for the exemption because payment
of the annuity did not depend upon the death of the debtor but
was a pension savings plan based upon employment.  In re
Cullison, 117 B.R. 314 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1990) .
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PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS.  The debtor made three
pre-petition payments for goods by check.  One check was
mailed and received more than 90 days before the petition but
was cashed 90 days before the petition.  The second check
was mailed before 90 days before the petition but was
received and cashed within 90 days of the petition.  The third
check was mailed, received and cashed within 90 days of the
petition and clearly was a preferential transfer.  The court
held that federal law determined when payment was received
for purposes of Section 547(b).  The court held that the date
of the transfer when payment is made by check is the date the
check is actually received by the payee.  Thus, the first
payment was not a preferential transfer but the second
payment was a preferential transfer.  In re Belknap, Inc. ,
909 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1990), aff'g in part and
rev'g in part, 96 B.R. 108 (W.D. Ky. 1989).
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL.  The debtor brought an action
for breach of contract and violation of the Agricultural Credit
Act of 1987 against a farm credit bank and the contract pur-
chasers of the debtor's farmland from the bank.  The contract
buyers requested a jury trial and moved for transmittal of the
case from the bankruptcy court.  Because the action was
primarily one at law entitling the contract buyers to a jury
trial and the contract buyers had not become involved in the
bankruptcy case, the court held that the action be transmitted
to the Federal District Court for a jury trial.  In re K Lazy
K Ranch, Inc., 117 B.R. 521 (Bankr. D. S . D .
1990) .
  CHAPTER 12
DISCHARGE.  During the Chapter 12 bankruptcy case,
the debtor used government farm program payments which
were collateral for a loan from a bank to pay expenses of the
farm without prior consent of the bank.  The Bankruptcy
Court had held that the debtor's conversion of the collateral
was not willful and malicious because the debtor had used the
proceeds in the farming operation.  The District Court held
that because the debtor had read the security agreement and
had experience with secured loans with the bank, the use of
the proceeds of the collateral was willful and malicious and
the debt to the bank would be nondischargeable as to the
amount of collateral converted.  Randall Bank v .
Melhus, 117 B.R. 648 (D. Kan. 1990).
ELIGIBILITY.  The debtors had filed a Chapter 11 case
and the Chapter 11 plan was confirmed.  The debtors made
all payments under the plan for the first year of the plan but
failed to make the payments for the second year.  When a
creditor threatened to foreclose, the debtors filed for Chapter
12.  The court held that because the confirmation and
discharge received in the Chapter 11 case revested the estate
property in the debtor, the debtor could file a Chapter 12 case
while still operating under a Chapter 11 plan.  In re
Grimes, 117 B.R. 531 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990).
  CHAPTER 13
AMOUNT OF CLAIM.  A junior creditor held a secured
judgment lien claim against the Chapter 13 debtor's home-
stead after the senior claims were deducted from the fair
market value of the homestead.  The debtor sought to reduce
the creditor's claim by reducing the remaining equity in the
homestead by the amount of the debtor's homestead exemp-
tion.  The court held that under In re Dixon, 885 F.2d 327
(6th Cir. 1989), see p. 11 supra, a homestead exemption
could not be asserted against a judgment lien because under
Ohio law a judgment lien does not attach to a homestead
until an action to enforce the lien has been brought.  In re
Smith, 117 B.R. 326 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ABANDONMENT.  The debtor filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy in 1983.  Later that same year, the trustee sold
the 1982 corn crop free and clear of liens with the
understanding that a claim by CCC, if found to be valid,
would attach to the proceedes and the interest earned on the
proceeds.  In 1986, the bankruptcy court determined that the
CCC claims were valid.  The trustee concluded that the CCC
liens exceeded the amount of the corn proceeds and applied to
abandon the proceeds.  The bankruptcy court approved the
abandonment and stated that the income tax liability on the
sale of the corn in 1983 fell to the debtor.  The bankruptcy
court decision was reversed by the district court which held
that the estate was taxable on the sale.  The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has affirmed the district court, stating-
". . . a contrary holding would have the effect of
burdening the debtor's fresh start under the bankruptcy
law."
In re  Bentley, 90-2 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,527 (8th Cir. 1990), aff'g , 89-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9597 (S.D. Iowa 1988), rev'g , 7 9
B.R. 413 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
AUTOMATIC STAY.  After confirmation and consum-
mation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan but before the closing
of the case, an IRS technician erroneously believed the case
to be closed and instituted automatic collection procedures
against the debtor.  The court held the actions of the techni-
cian were a willful violation of the automatic stay and
awarded the debtor attorney's fees and costs.  In re Bulson,
117 B.R. 537 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990).
DISCHARGE.  The debtor was a partner in a partnership.
Prior to 240 days before the filing of bankruptcy, the IRS
assessed the debtor for unpaid taxes based on disallowance of
losses from the partnership.  A second assessment occurred,
also prior to 240 days before the bankruptcy, after the Tax
Court allowed the losses claimed by the debtor.  A third
assessment occurred within 240 days before the bankruptcy
filing after the IRS disallowed the losses at the partnership
level.  The court held that the third assessment was nondis-
chargeable and rejected the debtor's argument that the third
assessment related back to the first assessment.  In re
Frary, 117 B.R. 541 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1990).
POST-PETITION INTEREST AND PENALTIES.  On
the date of the petition, the IRS held an oversecured tax lien
against the debtor's property.  However, by the time the
collateral was sold and payments were made on the lien, the
post-petition interest plus the principal exceeded the proceeds
from the sale of the property.  A junior creditor petitioned for
reduction of the post-petition interest, arguing that the IRS
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had unreasonably delayed in seeking payment from the
proceeds of the property and caused excess interest to accrue
on the lien.  The court held that although there may be some
particularly egregious circumstances in which such
abatement of post-petition interest on an oversecured claim
may be authorized by equity, the post-petition interest in this
case should be allowed because the junior creditor also was
not diligent in insuring that payment on the tax lien was
made as early as possible.  Matter of Lapiana, 9 0 9
F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'g , 100 B.R. 9 9 8
(N.D. Ill. 1989).
The IRS filed a claim for pre-petition withholding taxes,
interest and penalties in the debtor's Chapter 7 case.  The
amount of the claim was reduced and the reduced amount was
allowed as an unsecured priority claim.  The IRS then
assessed the remaining amount, post-petition interest and
penalties, and assessments for other taxes against the debtor
personally.  The debtor argued that the IRS was estopped
from assessing the additional amounts because there were
sufficient funds in the bankruptcy estate to pay the IRS
claims but the IRS failed to seek payment from the estate.
The court held that the IRS was not estopped because it made
no misrepresentations or otherwise misled the debtor.  In re
Stahly, 117 B.R. 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
COMMODITY FUTURES
BROKER DUTY.  The plaintiff made many trades in
commodity futures in a nondiscretionary account which even-
tually ended with a $1 million loss by the plaintiff.  The
plaintiff sued the commodity broker arguing that the broker
was negligent in failing to stop the plaintiff from making
the trades when the broker knew the plaintiff was unsuitable
to make the trades.  The court held that under Washington
law, a broker does not have a duty to warn a trader with a
nondiscretionary account that the trader may be unsuitable to
make the trades.  Wasnick v. Refco, 911 F.2d 3 4 5
(9th Cir. 1990).
REVIEW.  The CFTC has adopted as final rules estab-
lishing standards and procedures for CFTC review of
decisions of registered futures associations in disciplinary,
membership denial, registration and member responsibility
actions.  55 Fed. Reg. 41061 (Oct. 9, 1990).  
ENVIRONMENT
JURISDICTION.  The plaintiff filed an action with
the Pennsylvania Board of Claims against the Pa. Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources for revocation of a permit
to use septage on the plaintiff's christmas tree farm.  The
court held that the action was one sounding in tort for
damages and that the state had not waived sovereign immu-
nity for such actions; therefore, the Board of Claims was
without jurisdiction to hear the case.  Miller v. Cmwlth.




ADMINISTRATION.  The Office of the Secretary,
USDA has adopted as final the delegation of authority from
the Secretary of Agriculture to the Assistant Secretary for
Administration and from the Assistant Secretary for Admin-
istration to the Director, Office of Operations, to report
information to the IRS.  55 Fed. Reg. 39598 (Sept .
28, 1990).
ALIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS.  The
Secretaries of Agriculture and Labor have announced that the
number of additional aliens which should be admitted to the
U.S. or who should otherwise acquire the status of aliens
lawfully admitted for temporary residence under Section
210A of the INA to meet a shortage of seasonal agricultural
workers is zero.  55 Fed. Reg. 39993 (Oct. 1, 1990).
ANIMAL WELFARE ACT .  The respondent
operated a dog and cat care and housing facility with a Class
B license.  The APHIS conducted several inspections of the
respondent's facility with each inspection finding several
violations under the Animal Welfare Act and regulations and
with the respondent correcting the violations.  At two of the
inspections the respondent failed to produce business records,
claiming the illness of the spouse in charge of the records.
At the last inspection, the inspector decided not to inspect
the facility because of the implied threats of the respondent.
Although each violation was trivial and the respondent
corrected all violations, the ALJ held that the number of
violations and failure to provide records justified a civil
penalty and suspension.  Although APHIS requested a
$5,000 fine and 90 day suspension, the Judicial Officer
upheld the ALJ sanction of a $1,500 fine and 20 day
suspension along with an order to cease and desist the found
violations and to require the respondent's license to remain
suspended until complete compliance with the statute and
regulations has been accomplished.  In re  Stebane, 4 7
Agric. Dec. 1264 (1988).
The respondent operated a zoo which had a Class C
license under the Animal Welfare Act.  Several inspections
by the APHIS found several housekeeping violations of the
statute and regulations.  Although the respondent made good
faith efforts to correct the deficiencies, the JO upheld the
ALJ's sanction of a $1,000 fine and 20 day suspension with
a continued suspension until the respondent is in full com-
pliance with the statute and regulations.  In re Zoological
Consortium of Maryland, 47 Agric. Dec. 1 2 7 6
(1988) .
BRUCELLOSIS.  The APHIS has announced that the
brucellosis regulations are amended to change the classifica-
tion of Idaho from a Class A to a Class Free state.  55 Fed.
Reg. 41505 (Oct. 12, 1990).
CROP INSURANCE .  The FCIC adopted as final
amendments to the general crop insurance policy regulations
that endorsements for the 1991 and subsequent years were
subject to the availability of appropriations.  Editor's note:
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the conference version of the 1990 farm bill includes appro-
priations for the federal crop insurance program.  55 Fed.
Reg. 40787 (Oct. 5, 1990).
The FCIC has adopted as final amendments to the
Safflower crop insurance endorsement which change the
cancellation and termination dates and the date by which
contract changes are required to be filed in the agent's office.
55 Fed. Reg. 40787 (Oct. 5, 1990).
The FCIC has adopted as final amendments to the Forage
Production Crop Insurance regulations which add insurance
period ending dates for additional states and provide that the
premium reduction gained by insureds through good insuring
experience will extend beyond the 1989 crop year.  55 Fed.
Reg. 40788 (Oct. 5, 1990).
FARM LOANS .  The FmHA has amended the final
regulations governing servicing of delinquent farm loans due
from farmers who are about to or have entered the armed
services.  The amendments change the references to the loan
servicing notices required.  55 Fed. Reg. 40645 (Oct.
4, 1990).
GRAIN INSPECTION.  The FGIS has issued
proposed rules increasing by 13.5 percent the official inspec-
tion and weighing services fees under the Grain Standards
Act.  55 Fed. Reg. 40136 (Oct. 1, 1990).
MILK.  At the request of milk producer cooperative
associations, the Secretary of Agriculture held a rulemaking
proceeding on the issue of whether the price for producer
milk used to manufacture butter, nonfat dry milk powder and
cheese should be lowered by 40 cents per hundredweight for
two months because of a temporary glut of milk.  The
plaintiff argued that evaporated milk should also be included
in the price reduction but the Secretary allowed the price
reduction only for the other products.  The Secretary justified
excluding evaporated milk because of the lack of evidence
that handlers incurred losses in marketing milk for such use.
The court upheld the exclusion of evaporated milk because
the plaintiff alleged only that it had the capacity for increased
production of evaporated milk but did not show that it was
required to manufacture increased amounts of evaporated milk
because of the glut.  The plaintiff also argued that the price
reduction for some Class III products violated the requirement
that all products in a class be uniformly priced.  The
Secretary argued that because he had the authority to create a
new class for the involved products, a temporary change
which had the same effect was permissable.  The court
rejected this as too broad an interpretation of the Secretary's
authority but allowed the price reduction to stand because the
parties to the rulemaking proceeding contemplated the
temporary creation of a new class.  Defiance Mi lk
Products Co. v. Lyng, 47 Agric. Dec. 1377 (6th
Cir. 1988).
The AMS has adopted as final amendments to the U.S.
Standards for Dry Whey to allow collection of moisture
removed from cheese curd from salting to be further
processed as whey, if the moisture and salt are removed in an
approved manner.  55 Fed. Reg. 39911 (Oct. 1 ,
1990) .
NATIONAL FORESTS .  The Sierra Club brought
this action to force the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Forest Service to enforce a claim to federal reserved water
rights in national forest areas in Colorado.  The court held
that the matter was not ripe for litigation because the failure
of the Forest Service to act left the finality of the action
uncertain and the nature of the harm was speculative and
contingent.  Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1 4 0 5
(10th Cir. 1990), vac'g and rem'g , 661 F .Supp.
1490 (D. Colo. 1987).
PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT .  The
respondent was a corporation which operated a small live-
stock sales business, a posted stockyard under the P&S Act.
The respondent was found to have operated while its liabili-
ties exceeded its assets, failed to maintain a positive balance
in its custodial account, issued checks on its custodial
accounts without sufficient funds in the accounts to cover the
checks, and failed to keep sufficient records.  The ALJ issued
an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist the viola-
tions and suspended the respondent for the greater of 14 days
or until the respondent is in full compliance with the P&S
Act and regulations.  In re  Sarcoxie Community
Sales, Inc., 47 Agric. Dec. 1290 (1988).
The plaintiff operated a  cattle buying and selling com-
pany registered as a dealer under the P&S Act.  After an
audit, the plaintiff was charged with several violations of the
PSA because the invoices for cattle sold indicated that the
plaintiff charged a mark-up on the price of the cattle and a
commission.  The PSA alleged that because the plaintiff
charged a commission, the plaintiff represented that the
plaintiff purchased the cattle as a market agency and that the
price for the cattle was the price paid for them by the
plaintiff.  The JO and ALJ imposed a $25,000 fine, to be
held in abeyance for five years, and a six month suspension.
The plaintiff appealed the six month suspension.  The ALJ
argued that the sanction was not reviewable, but the court
held that a sanction could be reviewed to determine whether
the suspension was without justification in fact so as to
constitute an abuse of discretion.  The court held that
although the invoices were misleading, no evidence was
presented that the plaintiff in fact misled the buyers.  In
addition, the evidence demonstrated that the buyers were
sophisticated and knowledgeable about cattle pricing and had
not complained before or after the audit about the cattle
prices as being unfair.  Therefore, the court held that the
suspension was not warranted.  Ferguson v. U S D A ,
911 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1990).
The PSA has adopted as final amendments to the rules of
practice for reparation hearings.  The amendments change the
requirement for notice by certified or registered mail to notice
by whatever means is necessary.  The amendments also
provide that documents mailed by ordinary mail will be
considered to have been served on the date of mailing.  5 5
Fed. Reg. 41183 (Oct. 10, 1990).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODI-
TIES ACT .  The plaintiff sold perishable agricultural
commodities to the debtor and was not paid in a timely man-
ner.  The plaintiff sent notice of its intent to preserve PACA
trust benefits to the USDA but not to the debtor.  The
USDA, however, sent to the debtor a copy of its letter to the
plaintiff acknowledging the plaintiff's letter of intent.  The
court held that under 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(3), notice of intent
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to preserve PACA benefits must be sent to the party against
whom the benefits are sought; thus, the plaintiff failed to
properly preserve its benefits in the PACA trust.  The court
refused to decide the issue of whether the USDA acted as an
agent of the plaintiff in sending the copy of its acknowl-
edgement to the debtor or that such acknowledgement was
sufficient notice to the debtor.  In re  Marvin
Properties, Inc., 47 Agric. Dec. 1314 (9th Cir .
1988), aff'g , 76 B.R. 150 (Bankr. 9th Cir .
1987) .
The respondent was a broker who arranged a contract
between the complainant seller and a Canadian company for
the sale of a carload of broccoli.  The buyer rescinded the
contract during shipment and although the broker was
attempting to find an alternate sale of the broccoli, the seller
sold the broccoli at a price much less than the original
contract price.  The seller then sued the broker for the
contract price difference.  The JO held that assuming a valid
and enforceable contract was entered into, the seller relieved
the broker of any liability by taking control of the carload
and selling it to another party.  The failure of the broker to
maintain a memorandum of sale, as required by 7 C.F.R. §
46.28, did not make the broker liable on the contract because
the failure to maintain the memorandum did not cause the
rescission of the contract or the sale at a lesser price.
California Artichoke & Vegetable Growers Corp.
v. Schy, 47 Agric. Dec. 1324 (1988).
The respondent was an importer of produce from South
America and was affiliated through family members with a
produce buyer which purchased produce from the complainant
without timely payment.  The complainant alleged that the
respondent was liable for the produce sold because the
manager of the buyer represented that the respondent would
pay for the produce.  The JO ruled that the respondent was
not liable for the produce sales because the respondent never
represented that the buyers had authority to make purchases
for the respondent.  Floriza Sales Co., Inc. v. Pamco
Air Fresh, Inc., 47 Agric. Dec. 1328 (1988).
The defendants in this case included a produce buyer
licensed under PACA and the producer's creditor who received
payments from the producer on a loan.  The Secretary of
Agriculture brought this action against the creditor for the
return of funds which were subject to the PACA trust provi-
sions.  The court held that PACA did not authorize the return
of the funds where the creditor did not secure the loaned
money with the produce which gave rise to the PACA trust
and where the creditor had no knowledge that the funds used
to pay the loan were subject to the PACA trust provisions.
Lyng v. JDC Enter., 117 B.R. 268 (S.D. Tex .
1990) .
The AMS has issued proposed regulations which modify
the exemption for nonresident complainants in reparation
actions under PACA to give the Secretary the discretionary
authority to waive the furnishing of a bond by nonresident
complainants where the complainant's country provides an
administrative forum for U.S. residents similar to that
provided by PACA for nonresidents of the U.S.  55 Fed.
Reg. 41094 (Oct. 9, 1990).
RURAL HOUSING. The FmHA has issued proposed
regulations amending the Farm Labor Housing Loan and
Grant regulations to make changes to the basic rules concern-
ing unauthorized rents, income eligibility, occupancy of
labor housing and delegations of authority.  55 Fed. R e g .
39982 (Oct. 1, 1990).
SUGAR BEETS AND SUGARCANE.  The CCC
has announced the 1990 sugar beet national loan rate as
21.93 cents per pound.  The national loan rate for sugarcane
is 18.00 cents per pound.  55 Fed. Reg. 40414 (Oct.
3, 1990).
TOBACCO.  The ASCS has adopted as final amend-
ments to the regulations implementing the tobacco market-
ing quota and acreage allotment programs.  The amendments
consolidate 7 C.F.R. Parts 723, 724, 725 and 726 into Part
723 and do not contain any substantive changes.  55 Fed.
Reg. 39913 (Oct. 1, 1990).
The AMS has adopted as final amendments to the tobacco
grading regulations which add two grades to accommodate
green immature tobacco in the mixed group.  55 Fed.
Reg. 40645 (Oct. 4, 1990).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS .  At
the decedent's death, the corpus of a revocable trust for the
benefit of the decedent passed to an irrevocable trust estab-
lished by the predeceased spouse for the decedents' children.
The decedent also held a testamentary power of appointment
over a marital trust but did not exercise it, resulting in the
property from that trust also passing to the irrevocable trust.
Under the terms of the irrevocable trust, the beneficiaries
were to receive one half of the corpus when they reached age
35, which all had done by the decedent's death.  Thus, at the
decedent's death, one-half of the property passing from the
decedent's trust and the marital trust was distributed to the
children beneficiaries of the irrevocable trust.  The IRS ruled
that the amounts distributed to the children were not included
in the denominator of the applicable fraction for purposes of
determining the inclusion ratio under Section 2642(a).  Also,
because the decedent's estate failed to make an allocation
election under Section 2632(c), the GSTT exemption was to
be allocated first to property which is the subject of a direct
skip and second to transfers involving a taxable distribution
or taxable termination.  Ltr. Rul. 9037058, June 2 1 ,
1990 .
The settlor created irrevocable trusts for each of five
children with the income to be accumulated until the benefi-
ciary reaches age 35 and then the income is to be distributed
to the beneficiary during life.  At the death of a beneficiary,
the trust corpus is to pass to the beneficiary's living issue or,
if no issue is living, to the settlor's descendants as if by
intestacy.  The trusts were all irrevocable on September 25,
1985 and have not been amended.  The beneficiaries proposed
to amend the trusts to appoint the beneficiary of each trust as
a co-trustee of the trust.  The IRS held that the amendment
would not subject the trusts to GSTT or cause inclusion of
the trust corpus in the gross estates of the beneficiaries.
Ltr. Rul. 9038037, June 26, 1990.
The decedent's will created three trusts for three grandchil-
dren, with each trust funded with $150,000 in money and
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property.  The residue of the estate passed to the surviving
spouse with contingent remainders to the decedent's children,
The surviving spouse and the children propose to disclaim a
portion of the residuary estate such that each trust will
receive a total of $333,333.33 from the estate.  The IRS
ruled that the disclaimers were effective and the total amount
passing to the three trusts was eligible for the $1 million
exemption from GSTT.  Ltr. Rul. 9038051, June 2 8 ,
1990 .
GROSS ESTATE.  The taxpayer was a beneficiary of
a trust created in 1937.  The taxpayer held a general power of
appointment over the trust corpus until 1943 when the tax-
payer released part of the power such that the power allowed
the taxpayer to appoint the trust corpus only to family
members so that under the 1942 Code the trust property
would not be included in the taxpayer's gross estate.  The
taxpayer proposed to exercise the revised power of appoint-
ment in a will to family members in trust with the
beneficiaries receiving powers of appointment over trust
corpus.  The IRS ruled that because the 1951 amendments of
the 1942 Code were made effective as if enacted in 1942, the
current provisions of Section 2041(a)(1) applied.  Under
Section 2041(a)(1), a general power of appointment will
cause inclusion of the property in the gross estate only if
exercised in favor of the decedent, the decedent's gross estate
or the creditors of the decedent or the decedent's estate.
Because the taxpayer would appoint the property only to
family members, the property was not includible in the tax-
payer's gross estate.  Ltr. Rul. 9038024, June 2 9 ,
1990 .
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The taxpayer's will
established a marital trust which qualified as QTIP.  One of
the taxpayer's IRA accounts was to be distributed to the
marital trust and the will provided that the amount of the
annual installment payments from the IRA was to be based
on the life expectancy of the surviving spouse at the time the
marital trust was funded; however, the annual installment
was not to be less than the income earned by the IRA in that
year.  IRS ruled that the surviving spouse's interest in the
IRA would be eligible QTIP.  Ltr. Rul. 9038015, June
21, 1990.
Under the decedent's will, the surviving spouse was to
receive a life interest in the residence; however, under an
agreement with the other heirs, the surviving spouse received
the complete fee title to the house.  The court held that
because the estate tax return did not make a QTIP election as
to the decedent's interest in the house passing to the surviv-
ing spouse, the property was not eligible for QTIP.  In addi-
tion, the court held that because the spouse received the
interest in the residence under the agreement, the interest did
not qualify for the marital deduction because the interest did
not pass from the decedent.  The court rejected the argument
that the agreement functioned as a disclaimer because consid-
eration was given for the agreement and no disclaimer was
filed with the estate tax return.  Est. of Allen v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-514.
Under the decedent's will, all property was to pass to the
surviving spouse unless the spouse died before distribution
of the property.  A final order was filed in state court order-
ing the distribution of the estate to the surviving spouse.
Under Calif. Probate Code § 1036, survival clauses in wills
making marital deduction gifts are limited to no more than
six months.  The court held that the surviving spouse's
interest in the estate property was not eligible for the marital
deduction because the will contained an indefinite survival
clause.  The court rejected the estate's argument that the state
law limited the survival clause to six months, because the
language of the will did not state that the bequest was a
marital deduction gift.  Est. of Heim v. Comm'r, 90-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,040 (9th Cir. 1990) ,
aff'g , Estate of Heim, T.C. Memo. 1988-433.
The surviving spouse received from the decedent property
which the spouses owned as joint tenants, property which
the decedent owned individually which passed to the surviv-
ing spouse in trust in an amount equal to one-half of the
decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, and
property owned by the decedent which passed to the surviv-
ing spouse in trust from the residuary of the estate.  The
residuary trust did not provide for frequency of income pay-
ments to the surviving spouse.  The surviving spouse
disclaimed all interest in the joint tenancy property within
nine months after the decedent's death and the IRS held this
disclaimer to be timely.  The surviving spouse also dis-
claimed a portion of the property passing under the first trust
and the IRS held that because the spouse had not received any
benefit from the disclaimed property and the property was
severable from the nondisclaimed property, the disclaimer
was effective.  The passing of the disclaimed property to the
residuary trust did not make the disclaimer ineffective.  The
IRS also held that the term "adjusted gross estate" was to be
defined under Section 2056(c)(1) before repeal by ERTA such
that the deductions allowed under Section 2053 and 2054
would be subtracted from the gross estate.  The IRS also
ruled that under state law the residuary trust would be required
to distribute income at least annually so that the surviving
spouse's interest in the residuary trust would be QTIP.  Ltr.
Rul. 9038031, June 25, 1990.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  The decedent
bequeathed special use valuation property in trust to a daugh-
ter for ten years, with the daughter to receive the trust corpus
in fee simple at the end of the ten years.  If the daughter does
not survive the ten years, the corpus passes in trust for
another ten years with the granddaughter as beneficiary.
Because the will was silent as to any other contingent
remainders if the granddaughter does not survive her trust, the
corpus would pass to the descendants of the decedent's prede-
ceased son by intestacy.  The daughter signed the recapture
agreement in her own name and as guardian for the grand-
daughter but the descendents of the predeceased son did not
sign the agreement.  The 90 day perfection period had lapsed.
The IRS held that the probability, under the "Life Table for
Total Population: United States 1969-71" under Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-10, of the descendents of the predeceased son
receiving the property was .001126 and therefore was too
remote to require their signature on the recapture agreement.
Ltr. Rul. 9038002, June 8, 1990.
The decedent received specially valued farmland in a
marital trust in which the decedent was the sole income bene-
ficiary, had the power to invade trust corpus, and had a
testamentary general power to appoint the trust property.
Because the decedent would be treated as the owner of the
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marital trust and the trust property would be includible in the
decedent's estate, the pre-deceased spouse did not create a
successive interest by bequeathing the specially valued prop-
erty to the marital trust.  Therefore, the death of the decedent
ended the period for recapture of the special use valuation
benefits and any disposition of the property by persons to
whom the property was appointed by the decedent's will
would not cause recapture of the benefits.  Ltr. R u l .
9038016, June 21, 1990.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
  C CORPORATIONS  
LETTER RULINGS.  The IRS has issued a revised
checklist for use in submitting private letter ruling requests
regarding complete liquidations of subsidiary corporations
under Section 332.  Rev. Proc. 90-52, I.R.B. 1990-
41, 13.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS.  Two
individuals created the taxpayer corporation in order to hold
another corporation's stock which they purchased.  Each
individual purchased the stock from the shareholders of the
target corporation under sales contracts and transferred the
stock and sale contracts to the taxpayer.  The taxpayer also
purchased some of the stock by issuing a note to the corpora-
tion's shareholders.  The taxpayer defaulted on the contracts
and note and was insolvent.  The sellers of the stock agreed
to discharge the contracts and note for an amount less than
the contract and note amounts and agreed to apply the
amounts paid first to accrued unpaid interest and then to
principal.  The IRS ruled (1) the amounts by which the
contracts and note are reduced are to be applied first to unpaid
interest and then to principal; (2) the taxpayer could exclude
from discharge of indebtedness income the amount of its
insolvency; (3) the taxpayer could reduce tax attributes under
Section 108(b); (4) the taxpayer would recapture under the
tax benefit rule the amount of unpaid interest which was
excludible from gross income because of insolvency and
which provided a deduction in earlier taxable years; (5) the
taxpayer may be treated as the purchaser of the stock and the
reductions in the contracts and note may be treated as a
purchase price adjustment under Section 108(e)(5); and (6) for
alternative minimum tax purposes, the taxpayer could not
make an adjustment to adjusted net book income for income
arising from the discharge of indebtedness.  Ltr. R u l .
9037033, June 18, 1990.
A corporation in bankruptcy issued preferred stock with a
redemption price of $300,000 with a limited and preferred
liquidation preference of $300,000.  The corporation
transferred the stock to a creditor in exchange for a $300,000
indebtedness owed to the creditor.  Because the corporation
was in bankruptcy, the limitation under Section
108(e)(10)(B) of the exception to the stock-for-debt rule did
not apply but under Section 108(e)(8), the stock-for-debt
exception applies only to the extent of the $300,000 redemp-
tion price and the liquidation preference of the stock.  R e v .
Rul. 90-87, I.R.B. 1990-43, 7.
HOBBY LOSSES .  The taxpayers purchased an
interest in a cow which was used for embryo transplant
breeding purposes.  The court disallowed deductions with
respect to the investment because the investment was not
entered into with a profit motive where the taxpayers did not
investigate the viability of the investment; did not see,
possess or prepare to take possession of the cow; had no
expertise in raising or breeding cows; kept no records; and
inflated the purchase price and the costs of embryo
transplants.  Jackson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1990-520 .
The taxpayers were denied deductions for losses in excess
of income from a dog breeding activity where the activity had
five years of losses; the taxpayers did not acquire the neces-
sary permits and licenses for the activity, the taxpayers had
substantial outside income, and the taxpayers derived per-
sonal satisfaction and pleasure from raising and showing
dogs.  Carson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-508.
LETTER RULINGS.  The user fees for private letter
rulings expired on September 29, 1990, and re-enacting
legislation has not yet been passed.  The IRS announced that
(1) requests for letter rulings submitted after September 29,
1990, and before re-enactment of the fees should not include
user fees, (2) user fees received after September 29, 1990, for
requests submitted before September 29, 1990, will not be
returned, and (3) user fees for requests submitted after
September 29, 1990, will be determined under the re-enact-
ment legislation.  Ann. 90-113, I.R.B. 1990-41, 6.
  PARTNERSHIPS  
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  The taxpayer
was a general partner in a partnership which had filed Chapter
7 bankruptcy and liquidated.  After the partnership ceased to
operate, the IRS notified the taxpayer that the taxpayer was
selected as the partnership Tax Matters Partner and mailed to
the taxpayer a notice of final partnership administrative
adjustment for the taxable years of the partnership.  The
taxpayer objected to the selection as TMP and the FPAA,
arguing that the partnership no longer existed.  The court
held that because the FPAA related to taxable years when the
partnership did exist and the partner was the real party in
interest, the IRS procedure was proper.  Chef's Choice
Produce, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. No. 2 8
(1990) .
RETURNS.  The IRS has issued Form 8752 "Required
Payment or Refund Under Section 7519" for partnerships and
S corporations that have elected under Section 444 to have a
tax year other than a required tax year.  For applicable
election years beginning in 1990, Form 8752 must be filed
on or before May 15, 1991.  Ann. 90-112, I .R.B.
1990-40, 37.
PENALTIES.  The IRS issued a statutory notice of
deficiency in the amount of taxes paid by the taxpayers for
their 1984 return.  Because the deficiency was an understate-
ment of 18 percent of the tax liability for that year, the IRS
also assessed the penalty for substantial underpayment of tax
at the 25 percent rate in effect for assessments after October
21, 1986.  The taxpayers argued that the application of the
25 percent rate violated the constitutional prohibition against
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ex post facto laws.  The court held that the constitutional
prohibition did not apply because the penalty was civil in
nature and not so disproportionate to the violation so as to
be penal in nature.  Karpa v. Comm'r, 90-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,508 (4th Cir. 1990), aff'g,
T.C. Memo. 1989-535.
  S CORPORATIONS
CLASSES OF STOCK.  The IRS has issued proposed
regulations relating to the requirement that an S corporation
have only one class of stock, I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D).  Under
the proposed regulations, a corporation has more than one
class of stock if the outstanding shares do not confer identical
rights to distributions and liquidation proceeds, including
distributions that vary with respect to timing or amount.
The definition of distribution includes all definitions under
the Code and general principles of federal tax law.  Outstand-
ing stock does not include nonvested stock unless the share-
holder elects under Section 83(b) and does not include deferred
compensation arrangements which involve property not
subject to Section 83.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-
1(b)(3),(4).  Differences in voting rights, rights under buy-
sell agreements and restrictions on transferability of stock are
not considered to create a second class of stock.  Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1361-1(b)(l)(2).  
Debt obligations, regardless of designation, are considered
a second class of stock if the debt constitutes equity or
otherwise results in the owner as being treated as an owner of
stock under general principles of federal tax law.  Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(3)(ii).  See also Rev. Rul. 80-238,
1980-2 C.B.  96, Rev. Rul. 82-150, 1982-2 C.B. 110, Rev.
Rul. 85-87, 1985-1 C.B. 268.  Debt will not be treated as a
second class of stock, even if it would be treated as equity, if
the debt is supported by a written unconditional promise to
pay on demand or a specified date a sum certain and (1) the
interest rate and payment are not contingent on corporation
profits, corporation discretion or similar factors; (2) the debt
cannot be converted into stock; and (3) the creditor is an
individual, estate or trust described in Section 1361(c)(2).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(b)(l)(4).  In addition, the
interest rate must be a reasonable rate of interest based on all
facts and circumstances.  The proposed regulations, however,
provide that a rate equal to the applicable federal rate but not
more than five points above that rate is a reasonable rate for
a fixed rate debt.  For a variable rate debt, the rates charged
over the life of the debt must be determined using an
objective rate index, an interest rate publicly announced and
offered to unrelated borrowers, such as the applicable federal
rate, the prime rate of a financial institution or the London
Interbank Offered Rate.  The proposed regulations provide a
safe harbor reasonable interest rate for variable rate debt if (1)
the issue price of the debt equals the debt's price at maturity,
(2) the debt's interest rate is expressed as a fixed multiple of a
current objective interest index or as a constant number of
percentage points or basis points more or less than a current
objective interest index, and (3) the rate resulting from this
formula is at least equal to the applicable federal rate and not
greater than five points above the federal rate.
An option to purchase stock which is substantially
certain to be exercised is treated as a second class of stock.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(3)(iii).  55 Fed. R e g .
40879 (Oct. 5, 1990), adding Prop. Treas. R e g .
§ 1.1361-1(b) through (l).
TERMINATION.  Because of disputes between the
shareholders, an S corporation transferred assets to a new cor-
poration in a "type D" reorganization in exchange for the
stock of that corporation and distributed the stock to one
faction of disputing shareholders.  IRS held that the momen-
tary ownership of the new corporation stock did not cause the
termination of the S corporation status of the original corpo-
ration.  In addition, because the assets received by the new
corporation were received from a corporation not subject to
the net built-in gains tax, the new corporation will not be
subject to the built-in gains tax for the assets received.  Ltr.
Rul. 9038010, June 19, 1990.
After the S corporation hired a new accountant, the
accountant discovered that the corporation had C corporation
earnings for three taxable years in which the corporation also
had passive investment income greater than 25 percent of
gross receipts.  The corporation represented that it had used
due diligence in relying on its previous accountants and was
willing to take whatever steps the IRS deemed necessary to
correct the termination of S corporation status.  The IRS
ruled that the termination was inadvertent and would not
terminate the S corporation status if the earnings and profits
were distributed to the shareholders who shall treat the distri-
bution as occurring in the last of the three taxable years
involved with corresponding amendments to the tax returns
of the corporation and shareholders.  Ltr. Rul. 9037016 ,
June 15, 1990.
An S corporation had C corporation earnings and profits
at the time the corporation elected S corporation status.
Because of tree disease and several years of disastrous freezes,
the corporation had no income from the production of its
citrus trees and the income from rent and interest exceeded 25
percent of the corporation annual gross receipts for the three
taxable years after electing S corporation status.  Once the
effect of this was known to the shareholders, the corporation
paid all of the earnings and profits for the taxable years as
dividends to the shareholders who amended their returns for
the third taxable year and paid additional tax and interest from
the dividends.  IRS ruled that the termination of the S corpo-
ration status was inadvertent.  Ltr. Rul. 9038046, June
27, 1990.
SOCIAL SECURITY.  The maximum amount of
wages subject to social security tax for 1991 is $53,400.
TRUSTS .  Under the trust instrument, the trustee is
required to distribute all income from the trust to the benefi-
ciary, with income to be decreased by the amount of any
mortgage principal and interest payments.  During a taxable
year, the trust had $140X of rental income and made $130X
in mortgage interest ($100X) and principal ($30X) payments.
The IRS ruled that under federal law, the principal payments
cannot be deducted from the trust's or the beneficiary's tax-
able income.  Thus, the beneficiary had $40X of taxable
income from the trust.  Because the actual amount of trust
income distributed to the beneficiary was only $10X, the
trustee was to allocate to the beneficiary one-fourth (the
beneficiary's distributed share of income, $10X, divided by
the total trust taxable income, $40X) of the depreciation
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available to the trust.  Rev. Rul. 90-82, I.R.B. 1990-
41, 4.
WITHHOLDING TAXES.  The IRS has issued pro-
posed regulations implementing the backup withholding
rules of I.R.C. § 3406(a).  55 Fed. Reg. 39427 (Sept .
27, 1990).
The taxpayer paid the truck driver employees a set cents
per mile reimbursement for travel costs.  The IRS ruled that
in order for the reimbursements to be excluded from wages
for withholding tax purposes, (1) the employer must reason-
ably believe the employee could exclude the payments from
income as a working fringe under Section 132(d), (2) the
amounts were paid under an oral or written employment
agreement, and (3) the amounts were either paid separately or
paid with other employee remuneration and separately identi-
fied.  Ltr. Rul. 9038001, June 7, 1990.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
ORAL LEASE.  The landlord and tenant in this case
were brothers with an oral agreement to lease pasture land for
the raising of cattle.  The court found that the agreed upon
rental was $10 per head with a reduction to $4.50 for one
month when there was little grass.  The court also allowed
rent for three horses at the local rate for pasturing horses.
Rent for another three horses was not allowed because the
three horses were ordinarily included in a cattle pasture lease
because the horses were needed to work the cattle.  Prejudg-
ment interest was allowed for the cattle rent claim only.
Heitz v. Heitz, 795 P.2d 486 (Mont. 1990).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
HERBICIDE.  The defendant was a sweet potato farmer
who ordered the herbicide Lasso from the plaintiff, a local
cooperative.  The warehouseman at the coop gave the defen-
dant Lasso Atrazine which, when applied to the potatoes,
destroyed the crop.  The defendant admitted that he never read
the labels of herbicides applied to his crops and that the
employee who mixed the herbicide for application could not
read or write.  The plaintiff sued for payment for the herbi-
cide and the defendant reconvened for damages to the potato
crop. The court upheld summary judgment for the manufac-
turer of the herbicide because the labeling of the boxes was
sufficiently different so as to not be misleading.  The court
also held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury instruc-
tion limiting the defendant's damages to the cost of replant-
ing if the herbicide was applied within 24 hours of the plant-
ing of the potatoes.  The court found that expert testimony
that sweet potatoes begin to grow within hours demonstrated
that the potatoes were a growing crop at the time the herbi-
cide was applied.  The court also upheld the jury's appor-
tionment of fault at 75 percent by the plaintiff and 25 percent
by the defendant.  Evangeline Farmers Coop. v .
Fontenot, 565 So.2d 1040 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
TRACTORS.  The plaintiff was injured while operat-
ing a tractor manufactured by the defendant when the defen-
dant accidently engaged the forward range gear of the tractor
when attempting to dismount while the tractor was running.
The plaintiff alleged that the gear shift mechanism was defec-
tively designed to allow engagement of the range gear
without depressing the clutch.  The court upheld the trial
court's admission of videotapes and other evidence of tests
using the tractor which reconstructed the alleged accident.
Rios v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Co., 558 N.E.2d
252 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
AGISTER'S LIEN.  The debtor corporation had
contracted with a creditor to provide care for the debtor's
cattle.  The creditor claimed an agister's lien against the cattle
for the cost of the care of the cattle until the cattle were
transferred back to the debtor.  The debtor claimed that the
agister lien was invalid because the creditor failed to give the
debtor a receipt for the cattle when the creditor first took
possession of the cattle.  The court held that the receipt
provision under Ind. Code § 32-8-30-9 applied only where
the agister sought to sell the cattle in satisfaction of the debt
for the cost of caring for the cattle.  The court held that
because the creditor transferred the cattle back to the debtor
and asserted a claim in bankruptcy, the agister lien was valid
and enforceable.  Matter of Stookey Holsteins, Inc. ,
117 B.R. 402 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
FEED SUPPLIER'S LIEN.  The plaintiff was a feed
store which supplied feed to the defendant for horses owned
by the defendant.  The plaintiff was awarded a preliminary
injunction against the defendant's removal of the horses from
the court's jurisdiction and the defendant appealed, arguing
that the action was solely for money damages and that the
supplier had no lien on the horses to support the injunction.
The court held that Fla. Stat. § 713.65 created a lien for feed
suppliers only where the supplier had possession of the
animals; therefore, the plaintiff had no statutory lien against
the defendant's horses and the injunction was improper.
Turner v. Grif's Western, Inc., 565 So.2d 8 7 5
(Fla. Ct. App. 1990).
LIS PENDENS .  After filing an action for breach of
contract, fraud and civil theft, the plaintiff filed a lis pendens
against 50 bulls owned by the defendant.  The defendant filed
a motion to have the lis pendens stricken or to require the
plaintiff to file a bond.  The court held that the plaintiff must
either file a bond for the value of the bulls or the lis pendens
should be stricken because the defendant would be irreparably
harmed if prevented from selling the bulls because the bulls
would deteriorate during the possible lengthy legal process.
Bailey v. Rolling Meadow Ranch, Inc., 5 6 6
So.2d 63 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990).
UNJUST ENRICHMENT.  A feedlot operator had
agreed to liquidate the business after the operator's lender
refused to lend any more operating funds.  The lender agreed
to allow the feedlot to continue purchasing feed during the
liquidation and the plaintiff supplied the feedlot with grain
for which the plaintiff was not paid.  The plaintiff filed an
action for unjust enrichment against the lender which argued
that its security interest in the feedlot property held priority
to the plaintiff's claim.  The court upheld a jury verdict for
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the plaintiff and held that unjust enrichment of a secured
creditor could defeat the prior perfected security interest of the
creditor, because the collateral securing the creditor's loan
was benefited by the grain sold by the plaintiff to the feedlot.
Duggan, Inc. v. Ninth Dist. Prod. Credit Ass'n,
795 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App. 1990).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
GRASSHOPPERS.   In response to an increased
population of grasshoppers, the Minnesota legislature passed
a law requiring landowners in infested areas to spray for
grasshoppers.  The plaintiff was determined to have an
infestation of grasshoppers, and when the plaintiff refused to
spray, the county performed the spraying and assessed the
plaintiff for the costs.  The landowner attacked the law as
violating the plaintiff's due process and equal protection
rights and as violating the Minnesota Environmental Policy
Act.  The court held that the appeal procedures available
under Minn. Stat. chs. 278, 279 provided sufficient due
process for the plaintiff.  The court also rejected the plain-
tiff's equal protection claim in that geographical distinctions
required for the spraying had a rational basis.  The court held
that acts of the legislature were exempt from the provisions
of the MEPA.  Omdahl v. Hadler, 459 N.W.2d 3 5 5
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
WATER RIGHTS.  The plaintiffs applied for a condi-
tional direct flow right and a conditional storage right in two
lakes which were partially owned by the plaintiff and the
State of Colorado.  The Water Court granted summary judg-
ment to the state because the plaintiff did not establish a
right to use the land underlying the lakes.  The plaintiff
argued that it was not required to show ownership of the
underlying land in order to acquire a conditional water right.
The court held that the plaintiff was required by Colo. Rev.
Stat. 37-92-305(9)(b) to show that the water right will be
used and because the ownership of the lake land was a
requirement for using lake water, the plaintiff needed to show
some ownership interest in the lake land.  The state had
declared that it would not grant the plaintiff any rights in the
lake land owned by the state.  Although the plaintiff raised
several issues as to whether the plaintiff had a legal claim to
ownership of the lake land, the court held that the ownership
issues were beyond the jurisdiction of the Water Court and
warranted dismissal of the conditional water rights applica-
tion.  FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. State Div. o f
Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1990).
STATE TAXATION
HORSES .  The plaintiff sold rights to breed the
plaintiff's stallion to mares during the lifetime of the
stallion.  The purchasers of these right acquired no interest in
the stallion.  The court held that Ky. Stat. § 139.531(1)(a)
applied to impose a tax on the sale of the rights.  The court
held that Ky. Stat. § 139.351(2)(a) exempted from the tax
only sales of interests in a horse which was used for breeding
purposes.  Because the purchasers received no interest in the
stallion, the breeding rights were taxable.  Calumet Farm
v. Revenue Cabinet, 793 S.W.2d 830 (Ky. C t .
App. 1990).
SALES TAX .  The plaintiff manufactured and sold
plastic thermoformed calf hutches.  The Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Revenue assessed a sales tax on the sale of the
hutches and the assessment was upheld by the Tax Appeals
Commission on the grounds that the hutches were not
exempt as machines under Wis. Stat. § 77.54(3).  The court
held that because the hutches provide only housing and have
no active function in creating an environment conducive to
the production of calves, the hutches were not machines and
were subject to tax upon sale.  L.T. Hampel Corp. v .
Wis. Dept. of Rev., 459 N.W.2d 598 (Wis. C t .
App. 1990).
TRESPASS
PASTURE.  The plaintiff cattle ranchers owned pas-
ture land as tenants in common with the defendants but the
land was divided under a settlement in a partition action.  The
parties had also leased public lands which were contiguous to
the divided lands and as part of the court order in the partition
action, the leases were to be assigned to the parties receiving
the separate partials of land contiguous to the leased land.
The defendants continued, however, to use the land owned
and leased by the plaintiff and the plaintiff filed the present
trespass action.  When the leases ran out, the defendants
reapplied for all of the leases and forced the plaintiffs to sign
the leases under threat that the leases would otherwise be sold
to the public.  The partition order had also ordered the defen-
dants to remove a mortgage against the property transferred
to the plaintiffs but the defendants did not do so.  The defen-
dants asserted ownership over the land partitioned to the
plaintiffs on the theory that the mortgage and public leases
gave them ownership rights to the land.  The court held that
the use of the land, the application for the public leases and
the failure to remove the mortgage violated the court parti-
tioning order and that under that order the defendants had no
rights to the use of the land and the use of the land was an
actionable trespass.  TZ Land & Cattle Co. v .
Condict, 795 P.2d 1204 (Wyo. 1990).
CITATION UPDATES
Rod Warren Ink v. Comm'r, 912 F.2d 3 2 5
(9th Cir. 1990), rev'g 92 T.C. 995 (1989)  (theft
loss), see p. 183 supra.
